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BUILDING THE NEW LIBYA:  
LESSONS TO LEARN AND TO UNLEARN 
ANN ELIZABETH MAYER* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Of the countries where existing political systems were upended 
during 2011 in the course of the Arab Spring, Libya may have to 
undergo the most difficult transition during the process of shifting 
from dictatorship to the democracy with human rights protections 
that so many revolutionaries aspired to see realized.  It needs to 
move beyond decades of arbitrary rule by Mu`ammar al-Qaddafi, 
an eccentric despot who effectively dismantled all conventional 
governmental institutions.  In place of one man ruling by fiat, 
Libya must establish the rule of law. 
The shocking level of human rights violations to which Libyans 
had become accustomed can be appreciated by viewing video 
footage of the infamous 1984 show trial and public hanging of 
Sadiq Hamed Shwehdi, a grotesque travesty of criminal justice.  A 
dissident who was arrested for anti-regime activity, Shwehdi was 
subjected to a nationally televised show trial in a Benghazi 
basketball stadium, during which he was seated cross-legged on 
the stadium floor, his hands bound behind his back, looking 
anguished as observers in the stands hooted and jeered.  
Immediately after the “trial,” Shwehdi was hanged from the 
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gallows that had been set up in the stadium.1  As Shwehdi dangled 
from the gallows, a young woman, Huda Ben Amir, jumped up 
and rushed to grab his legs, gleefully yanking his body downward.  
She calculated rightly that her zeal would impress Qaddafi, and 
she was subsequently rewarded with riches, winding up among 
Libya’s pampered ruling elite.  She served twice as the mayor of 
Benghazi, a city notoriously hostile to Qaddafi, where her 
monstrous deed had earned her the hatred of the population and 
the sobriquet “Huda the Executioner.”2 
Not only did the regime think it fit to televise Shwehdi’s 
ordeal, but thousands of school children had been brought to the 
stadium to observe the spectacle and to learn firsthand an indelible 
lesson—that abject public humiliation and merciless savagery 
should be meted out to political opponents.  Questions about the 
lasting impact of Shwehdi’s televised show trial and hanging are 
linked to broader questions about the toxic legacy of more than 
four decades of Qaddafi’s iron-fisted dictatorship, which involved 
routine recourse to cruel torture, kidnappings, disappearances, 
protracted incommunicado incarceration, and murders of Libyans 
suspected of disloyalty.  Were the mentalities of many Libyans 
being so warped and coarsened by their regular exposure to 
atrocities that they wound up thinking that recourse to lethal 
vengeance was normal?  Or, did revulsion at Qaddafi’s excesses 
instill a determination to ensure a future when criminal justice 
would adhere to international rules and when respect for human 
rights would be secured?  It is too soon to predict where things will 
stand five years from Qaddafi’s overthrow, but in the immediate 
aftermath of the revolution, one could identify developments 
supporting both of these eventualities. 
                                                     
1 See Cameron Robertson et al., Libya Archive Reveals Pictorial History of 
Gaddafi’s Brutal Reign, GUARDIAN, (July 18, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/video/2011/jul/18/libya-muammar-gaddafi (detailing the public hanging 
of Sadiq Hamed Shwehdi, which took place after a show trial that included 
“forced confessions” before a rowdy audience).  
2 See Nick Meo, ‘Huda the Executioner’—Libya’s Devil in Female Form, 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 6, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8363587/Huda-the-executioner-Libyas-
devil-in-female-form.html. 
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2. CAUSES FOR WORRY 
For anyone concerned to see the rule of law established after 
Qaddafi’s overthrow, the manner of Qaddafi’s own death was an 
ominous portent.  Videos made from cell phones recorded his last 
minutes after his capture by rebel forces on October 20, 2011.3  
Young rebels fighting in the informal militias were shown 
assaulting a dazed and disheveled Qaddafi after he was found 
cowering in a large sewer pipe—a last minute attempt to escape in 
a convoy from his Sirte hiding place having gone awry.  The jerky 
videos, in which what is happening to Qaddafi is often obscured 
by those crowding around him, do prove that Qaddafi was 
screamed at, repeatedly pummeled, and roughly dragged about.  
Soon there was blood copiously streaming down the left side of his 
head and onto his chest.  With looks of terror and bewilderment 
alternating on his countenance, he seemed to struggle to 
understand what was happening to him.  How he died is not 
shown in the videos and remains uncertain.4  A subsequent 
investigation by Human Rights Watch uncovered evidence of 
brutal beatings and summary executions of captured members of 
Qaddafi’s convoy, including his son Mu`tasim, but, on receiving 
the NGO’s report, the Libyan authorities maintained that the 
deaths were battle-related, which was indicative of their 
disinclination to prosecute the perpetrators.5 
Qaddafi’s corpse, showing bruises and wounds but with much 
of the blood wiped away, was later placed on public display next 
to that of his son for several days in a meat locker in Misrata, a city 
where his regime was bitterly detested.  Libyans formed long lines 
                                                     
3 See, e.g., RussiaToday, ‘We Need Him Alive!’ Earliest Graphic Video of Gaddafi 
Capture, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-
ZZzveRO6A&skipcontrinter=1 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (depicting the brutal 
treatment of Qaddafi in the wake of his capture).  
4 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEATH OF A DICTATOR: BLOODY VENGEANCE 
IN SIRTE 28–29 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/libya1012webwcover_0.pdf (describing the militia fighters’ capture and 
abuse of Qaddafi leading up to his death). 
5 See id. at 46–47 (noting an inconsistency between evidence gathered by 
Human Rights Watch and the Libyan authorities’ contention that Qaddafi, his 
son, and a number of loyalists were killed during battle). 
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to view the stinking, decomposing corpse.6  As others gaped and 
gloated, a sober onlooker expressed well-founded misgivings: “On 
the one hand, I celebrate this day, but the uncertainty is profound.  
What has Gaddafi done to these people, these young boys who 
killed him?  They knew nothing else.  But now they must learn 
something else, another way, or we will never move on.”7 
Qaddafi’s captors had a better option—turning their captive 
over to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  An obvious way of 
strengthening the rule of law would be to enhance ties to 
international law and international institutions such as the ICC.  As 
of October 2012, among the worrying signals that the road ahead 
could be rocky, one could observe indications that powerful forces 
in post-Qaddafi Libya were resisting collaboration with the ICC 
and acting in ways that belied the frequent promises that human 
rights would be respected in the new Libya.  On June 27, 2011, the 
ICC had issued an arrest warrant charging Qaddafi with 
committing crimes against humanity.  Had Qaddafi been put on 
trial in The Hague, he finally would have had to confront in a 
public forum the wide range of criminal offenses that he had 
committed since the onset of the revolution.  Had Libyans been 
able to observe him being prosecuted for his crimes by judges 
using international law, they could have seen a model to emulate 
that could have provided lessons about the reforms that needed to 
be instituted in Libya’s skeletal, shaky legal system.  As it was, 
Qaddafi’s extrajudicial execution and the undignified display of 
his corpse inadvertently reinforced the idea that horrendous 
brutality should be avenged by an equal measure of brutality, a 
lesson that can only have nefarious consequences in the 
circumstances of present day Libya, where lawlessness prevails in 
many quarters and where groups that feel aggrieved over past 
wrongs are eager to settle scores. 
Unlike its neighbors, Egypt and Tunisia, where largely peaceful 
mass protests led to the rapid overthrow of the local dictators, 
Libya was wracked from February through October 2011 by 
                                                     
6 See Martin Chulov, Gaddafi’s Corpse Continues to Attract Impatient Misrata 
Hordes, GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2011, 2:47 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2011/oct/23/gaddafi-corpse-attracts-misrata-hordes (reporting on the crowds 
that flocked to view Qaddafi’s corpse in Misrata). 
7 Id. 
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intense and destructive military battles that exacerbated 
fissiparous tendencies, engendering new enmities and aggravating 
tensions that Qaddafi had deliberately stirred up.  Following a 
policy of divide and rule, he had exploited historic rivalries, 
strongly favoring some groups and regions at the expense of 
others.  After war broke out, tribes, regions, and communities 
became polarized, as happened, for example, in the case of two 
cities along the central coast—Sirte and Misrata.  Sirte, a city on 
which Qaddafi had lavished funding for ambitious projects, 
remained a bastion of Qaddafi loyalists, and, despite fierce attacks, 
it held out till the last week of warfare.  Misrata, a city that did not 
enjoy Qaddafi’s favor and had quickly sided with the rebels, 
suffered extensive destruction and losses under lethal military 
assaults carried out by Qaddafi loyalists.  In the aftermath, the two 
cities were left infected by mutual hatreds that could take a long 
time to heal.8 
In a troubling coda to Qaddafi’s murder, Omran Shaban, one of 
the rebels who had apprehended him, was captured in July 2012 
by men from Bani Walid, a stronghold of Qaddafi supporters.  The 
latter sought revenge by beating Shaban and repeatedly slashing 
his chest with razors, inflicting grievous injuries that led to his 
death.9  Shaban’s murder then provoked a military attack on Bani 
Walid from his hometown, Misrata, which, in turn caused 
denunciations and protests.10  Allowing such spirals of lethal 
vengeance to continue could only lead to unremitting violence. 
There was no army capable of curtailing the violence, because 
Libya’s military had been deliberately enfeebled by Qaddafi due to 
his fear of potential coups.  He had relied on his security forces to 
                                                     
8 See generally Jon Donnison, Sirte and Misrata: A Tale of Two War-Torn Libyan 
Cities, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Dec. 20, 2011, 6:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-africa-16257289. 
9 Gaddafi Captor Dies After Revenge Attack, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2012. 
10 Libyan Militias Shell Former Gaddafi Stronghold Town, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 
2012, 2:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/17/us-libya-clashes-
idUSBRE89G1EE20121017; Kareem Fahim, Libyan Forces Now Control Restive Town, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/ 
world/africa/libyan-forces-now-control-bani-walid-officials-say.html (describing 
the attack on Bani Walid, which resulted in many deaths and the wounding of 
hundreds and prompted accusations that militias with governmental support had 
been punishing the town for supporting Qaddafi). 
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maintain his stranglehold on power.  Once he was overthrown, his 
security apparatus disintegrated, leaving no force that could exert 
control over the disparate rebel militias that had sprung up to fight 
Qaddafi, militias whose members seemed eager to utilize their 
weaponry and who were not above indulging in wanton violence 
and criminality.11  Their actions were not inhibited by concerns 
about respecting human rights.  Already in 2011, a number of 
instances had come to light of militias exacting vengeance in a style 
that suggested that they were copying Qaddafi’s methods.12  In 
January 2012, credible reports surfaced of tortures being meted out 
to detainees who were held by militias.13 
As the months passed, militias kept acting as if they were 
determined to prove that there were no forces that could stop them 
from publicly flexing their muscles.  The waves of criminality and 
the manifestations of untrammeled power on the part of 
intransigent militias seeking to advance their own agendas came to 
                                                     
11 See, e.g., Margaret Coker, Rival Militias Battle in Libyan Capital, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 4, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970203550304577138272815070632.html (discussing Libya’s need 
for a central military command, the lack of which allowed a two hour street battle 
in central Tripoli to escalate). 
12 See, e.g., Libyan Rebels Detaining Thousands Illegally, Ban Ki-moon Reports, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
nov/24/libya-illegal-detentions-un-report (stating that former Libyan rebels have 
illegally detained thousands of people, while also engaging in revenge killings of 
members of Libya’s Black African community); Daniel Williams, The Murder 
Brigades of Misrata: Gadhafi’s Demise Was Just a Part of a Vast Revenge Killing Spree, 
SALON, (Oct. 28, 2011, 8:00 AM) http://www.salon.com/2011/10/28/ 
the_murder_brigades_of_misrata/ (asserting that in their quest for vengeance, 
Misrata brigades have “engaged in torture, pursed suspected enemies far and 
wide, detained them and shot them in detention”); Libya: Apparent Execution of 53 
Gaddafi Supporters, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2011/10/24/libya-apparent-execution-53-gaddafi-supporters (“The 
evidence suggests that some of the victims were shot while being held as 
prisoners, when that part of Sirte was controlled by anti-Gaddafi brigades who 
appear to act outside the control of the National Transitional Council.”). 
13 See, e.g., Libyan Detainees Died After Torture, Human Rights Group Says, CNN 
(Jan. 26, 2012, 11:19 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/26/world/ 
africa/libya-msf-torture/ (discussing the “widespread torture and ill-treatment of 
suspected pro-Gadhafi fighters and loyalists” in Libya) (quoting Amnesty 
International). 
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pose serious threats.14  In this regard, Libya is in a dramatically 
different position from that of post-revolutionary Egypt, where a 
vastly bloated and well-entrenched military institution constitutes 
a central obstacle to achieving true democratic reform.  Lacking 
any organized army or police force capable of managing the 
worsening chaos, Libya essentially has the opposite problem. 
Over the course of 2012, concerns mounted as Libyans 
confronted the spreading lawlessness, which included incidents 
that suggested that armed and well-organized terrorist cells were 
making inroads.15  Disturbing signs of a breakdown in law and 
order in Benghazi proliferated in 2012 as shadowy groups 
repeatedly attacked international organizations and Western 
targets.  In April, a bomb was thrown at a convoy that included the 
head of the U.N. mission to Libya, and in May, the Red Cross office 
was hit with a rocket.  The British abandoned their Benghazi 
consulate after a diplomatic convoy was attacked in June.  In 
August a pipe bomb exploded in front of the U.S. consulate.  Like 
many other Muslim countries, Libya was swept by angry anti-
American demonstrations in September 2012 in the wake of a 
controversy stirred up over a trailer on YouTube for a film 
produced in Los Angeles called “Innocence of Muslims.”  Replete 
with insults directed at the Prophet Muhammad that were 
deliberately designed to outrage Muslims, the privately produced 
film was widely blamed on the U.S. government, despite there 
being absolutely no governmental connection.  On September 11, 
2012, a Benghazi mob that was protesting the film attacked the U.S. 
consulate, and in the ensuing mayhem, an organized military 
assault was launched on a nearby safe house where the visiting 
U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens had taken refuge, ending 
with the death of the ambassador and three of his staff.16  Because 
                                                     
14 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Libya: Armed and Dangerous, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 10, 
2012, at 7 (explaining that members of disbanded militias refuse to relinquish their 
weapons and warn that they will turn on the “nascent state” if their demands are 
not met). 
15 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Libyan Armed Islamists Driven Underground, FIN. 
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, at 6 (examining the post-election culture of militia violence in 
Libya and popular perceptions of this problem). 
16 See US Envoy Dies in Benghazi Consulate Attack, ALJAZEERA, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/20129112108737726.html 
(last modified, Sept. 12, 2012); Harald Doornbos & Jenan Moussa, ‘Troubling’ 
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Libyans were typically grateful for U.S. assistance during the 
revolution and because the ambassador himself was a popular 
figure, the killings suggested that radical Islamist groups with ties 
to terrorist networks could be targeting Western interests and 
menacing Libya’s nascent democracy. 
Another harmful outcome of the civil war was that racial 
tensions were exacerbated.  Qaddafi, who had arranged for himself 
to be proclaimed the African “King of Kings,” was known for 
courting popularity among Sub-Saharan African leaders by 
dispensing generous financial subsidies and funding showcase 
projects.  He also invited Sub-Saharan Africans to resettle in Libya, 
which was an attractive option for many of them, given Libya’s 
relative affluence.  As a result, Libya’s indigenous Black African 
minority was swelled by hundreds of thousands of Sub-Saharan 
African migrants.  Once the revolution began, such migrants were 
alleged to have fought on Qaddafi’s side in return for pay.  Among 
Libyans opposed to Qaddafi, a stereotype developed about pro-
Qaddafi forces being heavily manned by mercenaries of Black 
African descent—both migrants and Libyans, a stereotype that led 
to stigmatizing all Black Africans as enemies of the revolution.17  
This mindset has prompted abuse of Black Africans—suggesting 
that racial bigotry has gained ground.18  In the case of Tawergha, a 
town populated by Black African Libyans, many of whom backed 
Qaddafi, the inhabitants were terrorized and chased away by rebel 
forces, leaving a ghost town, which was then vandalized.19  In a 
                                                                                                                        
Surveillance Before Benghazi Attack, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 1, 2012) 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/01/troubling_surveillance_ 
before_benghazi_attack (reporting on the discovery of important evidence weeks 
after the attack that suggested that hostile forces had had the consulate under 
surveillance, but asserting that conclusive proof of who was behind the attack was 
still lacking). 
17 See, e.g., Black Africans Come Under Fire in Libya, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 14, 2011), 
http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/black-africans-come-under-fire-libya 
(detailing the rise of racist attitudes in post-Qaddafi Libya through video clips 
and social media postings). 
18 See Libya: Stop Arbitrary Arrests of Black Africans, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 4, 
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/04/libya-stop-arbitrary-arrests-
black-africans (explaining that many migrant workers in Libya have recently been 
detained because of their race and national origin). 
19 Libya: Militias Terrorizing Residents of ‘Loyalist’ Town: Beatings, Shootings, 
Deaths in Detention of Tawerghans, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 30, 2011), 
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world where the infamous ethnic cleansings that transpired during 
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia are a searing memory, 
incidents of ethnic cleansing like the one in Tawergha highlight the 
urgent need for concerted efforts to reconcile opposing factions. 
Corruption constituted another peril.  One consequence of 
Qaddafi’s despotic system was the creation of a ruling elite that was 
free of any accountability.  In particular, members of Qaddafi’s own 
family enjoyed flamboyantly lavish lifestyles, with several of his sons 
becoming internationally notorious for their extravagant spending in 
locales like St. Barts, London, Paris, Rome, and Venice.  With no one 
to control the Qaddafis’ greedy predations, Libya became a petri dish 
in which corruption metastasized.  This led Transparency 
International to give Libya a 168 ranking, placing it among the 
world’s most corrupt countries.20  As Libya seeks to establish the 
principle of accountability, essential for good governance, the task of 
eradicating an ingrained culture of gross corruption looms large. 
A further source of worry was that ambitious Islamist factions 
were demanding to play a role in Libya’s government.  Like their 
counterparts in Egypt and Tunisia, Libya’s Islamists viewed the 
demise of secular despotism as opening the door for them to 
realize their vision of a society ruled by Islamic law.  Libya’s 
Islamists felt that they had earned a place in the new order, having 
figured among Qaddafi’s most determined foes and having fought 
vigorously on the rebels’ side.  The most prominent Islamist was 
the military commander Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who in November 
2011 wound up as the head of the Tripoli Military Council.  In a 
published statement, Belhaj made it clear that Islamists would 
demand to play a role in the new system, while also offering 
assurances that they would abide by the rules of democracy.21 
                                                                                                                        
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/30/libya-militias-terrorizing-residents-
loyalist-town. 
20 See 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/#CountryResults (last visited Nov. 
7, 2012). 
21 See Abdel Hakim Belhaj, The Revolution Belongs to All Libyans, Secular or Not, 
Posted in Comment Is Free, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2011, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/27/revolution-belongs-
to-all-libyans (describing the persecution and repression long endured by 
Islamists who opposed Qaddafi and their contributions to the revolution, and 
asserting their entitlement to be full participants in in a new democratic order). 
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What the rise of Libyan Islamists to positions of power would 
mean was open to speculation, because they include both 
moderate and extremist factions.  Nonetheless, past experiences 
give reason to doubt the solidity of their commitment to 
democratic freedoms.  In those countries where Islamists have 
gained control or have managed to dictate the political agendas, 
this has led to decimating civil and political rights and a significant 
deterioration in the rule of law as highly politicized versions of 
Islamic law become treated as governing standards.  The cases of 
Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan illustrate how the ascendancy of 
Islamism correlates with setbacks for democracy, the erosion of 
freedoms of expression and religion, and severe curbs on the rights 
of women.22  The fact that Islamist parties made a weak showing in 
the July 2012 General National Congress elections gave the more 
secular forces some breathing room.  Nonetheless, Libyans had 
reason to be anxious about whether Libya’s Islamists would accept 
life under a basically secular system.  By October 2012, Islamist 
militias and spokesmen for the Islamist cause were expressing 
anger over their inability to dictate policies and were becoming 
more belligerent in their demands for implementing Islamic law.23  
Ahmed Abu Khattala, a prominent Islamist leader who was widely 
suspected of involvement in the attack that killed the U.S. 
ambassador, stated in an interview that democracy violated 
Islamic law and called Muslims who supported secular 
constitutions “apostates,” while expressing contempt for 
capabilities of the transitional government.24 
3. LIBYAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS ACTIVISTS MAKE WAVES BUT 
ENCOUNTER RESISTANCE 
Even without facing an Islamist takeover, Libyan women’s 
struggle to achieve greater equality had to confront setbacks.  
                                                     
22 See generally ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION 
AND POLITICS (5th ed. 2012) (discussing human rights schemes that utilize Islamic 
criteria to weaken international human rights law). 
23 See Daragahi, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing Libya’s chaotic post-
revolutionary political climate). 
24 David D. Kirkpatrick, Suspect in the Benghazi Attack, In Plain Sight, Scoffs at 
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/19/ 
world/africa/suspect-in-benghazi-attack-scoffs-at-us.html. 
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Libya’s feminists initially felt empowered by the revolutionary 
upheaval, which raised women’s hopes for an expansion of their 
rights.25  They subsequently encountered indications that their 
work would not be easy. 
Libyans sympathetic to women’s aspirations to see 
discriminatory laws rolled back were dismayed by an event on 
October 29, 2011, when, in proclaiming the success of the Libyan 
revolution, the head of the interim government, Mustafa Abdul 
Jalil, endorsed a retrograde stance on polygamy.  Instead of using 
this historic occasion to promise Libyans that they would see a new 
birth of freedom and an end to horrors like torture and execution 
of dissidents, Jalil promised Libyan men that they could henceforth 
take extra wives with no need to consult their existing wives, 
repeating this announcement on the following day.26  In so doing, 
he indicated that his priority was revising Libyan family law in the 
direction of reinstating rules of medieval Islamic jurisprudence, 
which gave men unfettered discretion to contract marriages with 
up to four women at a time.  Libya under Qaddafi had retained 
laws restricting women’s rights, including various rules of 
personal status that derived from Islamic law, but some reforms 
had been undertaken.  These included an attempt to mitigate the 
harms of polygamy by imposing a requirement that, prior to 
contracting marriage with an additional wife, the husband needed 
to obtain the permission of his previous wife or wives.27  Abdul 
                                                     
25 See, e.g., Manal Omar, Women in Libya and the Arab Spring, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 4, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/manal-
omar/arab-spring-libya-women_b_1076873.html (arguing for a greater role for 
women in Libya’s post-conflict reconstruction); Kathryn Spellman-Poots, Women 
in the New Libya: Challenges Ahead, OPENDEMOCRACY (Dec. 23, 2011), 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/kathryn-spellman-poots/women-in-new-
libya-challenges-ahead (assessing the trajectory of women’s rights in post-Qaddafi 
Libya). 
26 See Adam Nossiter, Hinting at an End to a Curb on Polygamy, Interim Libyan 
Leader Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2011, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/30/world/africa/libyan-leaders-remark-favoring-polygamy-stirs-
anger.html (describing the reaction of Libyans to Mustafa Abdel-Jalil’s call for an 
unrestricted right to take multiple wives). 
27 See Alison Pargeter, Libya, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA: PROGRESS AMID RESISTANCE 11 (Sanja Kelly and Julia Breslin eds., 
2010), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_ 
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Jalil’s surprising decision to prioritize cancelling this modest 
reform, possibly offered as a gesture to placate Islamists, made it 
seem as if the enormous sacrifices of the revolution had been 
incurred in order to ensure men’s right to take additional wives 
with no regard for their existing wives’ interests and feelings. 
In a breakthrough, an independent women’s conference was 
held from November 11–15, 2011.  Qaddafi had not allowed any 
independent women’s rights NGOs to function, so this was a 
welcome opportunity for Libyan women for the first time in 
decades to discuss and set their own goals.  Their support for 
international law was unconditional.  Among their 
recommendations were that Libya should ratify all international 
human rights conventions, achieve the principle of gender equality 
in rights and duties, amend existing laws to bring them in line with 
international and regional conventions that prevent violence 
against women and girls, fix a minimum forty percent quota for 
women in politics, employ the media to change the stereotypical 
image of women, and support programs on women’s reproductive 
health and maternal and child care.28 
It came as a disappointment that a women’s quota was 
dropped from the electoral law that was drafted in January 2012.29  
Nonetheless, women managed to win seventeen percent of the 
seats in the July elections.30  This was enough to ensure that they 
would have some voice in the legislature. 
4. CONFRONTING A LEGACY OF ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-
DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY AND PSEUDO-HUMAN RIGHTS 
To build up respect for the rule of law, Libyans will have to 
undertake a strenuous ideological housecleaning, eradicating the 
                                                                                                                        
images/Libya.pdf (indicating that a man seeking a second wife must secure 
judicial permission and obtain a written agreement of the first wife). 
28 Libyan Women Want a Say in Running the New Libya, TRIPOLI POST (Nov. 19, 
2011, 10:15 AM) http://tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=1&i=7321&archive=1. 
29 See Bourzou Daragahi, Libya Drops Parliamentary Quota for Women, FIN. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012 (documenting a women’s rights activist’s disappointment that 
the proposed quota was eliminated from the final draft of the electoral law). 
30 Dominique Sogue, Libyan Elections Give Women a 17% Starting Point, WE-
NEWS (July 18, 2012), http://womensenews.org/story/the-world/120719/libyan-
elections-give-women-17-starting-point. 
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traces of Qaddafi’s Green Book, the tenets of which were constantly 
extolled in the media and were also taught in educational 
institutions as part of the official personality cult in which Qaddafi 
was effectively held up as a kind of prophetic genius.  As part of 
his teachings, Qaddafi insistently denounced democracy as a fraud 
and asserted that constitutions were meaningless in a state that 
followed his philosophy, while extolling his own idiosyncratic 
human rights charter, which was designed to accommodate a 
policy of crushing all dissent.  In the post-Qaddafi era, many 
Libyans who remain imbued with Qaddafi’s ideology will require 
reeducation to grasp what civil and political rights actually mean. 
In the first years after Qaddafi seized power in 1969, Libyans 
had lived under a rudimentary constitution.  Constitutionalism 
was repudiated in 1977 when the declaration of people’s power was 
issued, inaugurating a so-called “state of the masses” that was 
denoted by the Arabic neologism jamahiriyya.  Thenceforth, Libyans 
had to defer to the teachings of the Green Book, which purportedly 
solved all the problems of government, economics, and society.31  
According to Qaddafi’s Green Book theory, Libyans were to govern 
themselves via an extensive network of committees and congresses, 
obviating the need for a constitution or for any conventional 
governmental institutions.32  In reality, these committees and 
congresses were only window dressing; Qaddafi clung tightly to the 
reins of power, reserving all-important decisions to his inner circle 
and relying on strategies typical of police states to compel 
acquiescence.33 
                                                     
31 See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, In Search of Sacred Law: The Meandering 
Course of Qadhafi’s Legal Policy, in QADHAFI’S LIBYA 1969–1994, 113–37 (Dirk 
Vandewalle ed., 1995); Hanspeter Mattes, Formal and Informal Authority in Libya 
Since 1969, in LIBYA SINCE 1969: QADHAFI’S REVOLUTION REVISITED, 55, 56–62 (Dirk 
Vandewalle ed., 2008) (analyzing the structure and institutions of Qaddafi’s 
political system and the mechanisms wielded by the regime to secure power and 
crush opponents). 
32 Id. at 66–69 (explaining the role and structure of committees under the 
Qaddafi regime). 
33 See, e.g., Dirk Vandewalle, Libya’s Revolution in Perspective: 1969–2000, in 
LIBYA SINCE 1969, supra note 31, at 9, 28–34 (describing strategies used by Qaddafi 
to quell all resistance and dissent); Alison Pargeter, LIBYA: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
QADDAFI 97 (2012) (recounting Qaddafi’s decision to create the Revolutionary 
Committees Movement, a paramilitary body whose main purpose was to repress 
dissidents and “destroy any organization that stands in the way.”) (citing 
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The result was a society whose inhabitants were stripped of civil 
and political rights, as indicated by the 2010 Index of Democracy 
published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which evaluates 
countries based on electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the 
functioning of government, political participation, and political 
culture.  It ranked Libya at 158 out of the 167 countries surveyed.  On 
a ten-point scale, Norway ranked at the top of the index with a score 
of 9.80; Libya’s score was 1.94.  Only a few countries ranked lower, 
including North Korea, which ranked lowest at 167 and scored 
1.08.34 
As the potency of human rights ideals made itself felt, Qaddafi 
found it essential to pretend that he, too, believed in human rights.  
He obviously could not accept the rights set in international law, 
which would enable his restive citizenry to stand up to his regime, 
so he instead presented Libyans with his own twisted version of 
human rights, which was tailored to ensure the ascendancy of his 
ideology and to criminalize any dissent.  The Great Green Charter of 
Human Rights in the Era of the Masses was issued on June 12, 1988.35  
Libyans were taught to treat this charter as the definitive statement of 
human rights—even though it amounted to a kind of funhouse 
distortion of human rights principles. 
Reflecting Qaddafi’s insistence that Libyans uphold his Green 
Book, Article 25 required all citizens to defend Qaddafi’s jamahiriyya 
system unto death.  Not surprisingly for a charter with such an 
obvious political bias, basic civil and political rights were omitted.  
For example, there was no freedom of conscience or religion, no right 
of peaceful assembly, no freedom of expression or general principle 
of freedom of association, no equal protection clause, no prohibition 
of torture, no guarantee against arbitrary arrest and detention, no 
protection against unreasonable searches, no presumption of 
innocence for the accused, no guarantee against compelled 
testimony, no right to legal assistance for the criminal accused, no 
                                                                                                                        
Hanspeter Mattes, The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Committees, in QADHAFI’S 
LIBYA, supra note 31, at 93). 
34 Economist Intelligence Unit, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2010: DEMOCRACY IN 
RETREAT (2010), available at http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_ 
Index_2010_web.pdf. 
35 See THE GREAT GREEN CHARTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE JAMAHIRIYAN ERA 
(1988), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3dda540f4.pdf. 
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guarantee of a public trial, no right of appeal from court judgments 
except where the death penalty was at stake, and no prohibition of 
the imposition of penalties for acts not previously defined as criminal 
in the text of a law. 
The Green Charter included provisions that belonged in a penal 
code, providing for criminal prosecutions for acts described in broad 
terms that in the Libyan context could be used to criminalize dissent 
and opposition.  For example, Article 5 prohibited clandestine action, 
violence, terrorism, and sabotage, with the admonition that any act of 
hostility towards the jamahiriyya in connection with a foreign entity 
was high treason.  In outlawing monopoly or exploitation of religion 
and stirring up sedition, tribalism, partisanship, factionalism, or 
internecine fighting, Article 10 provided a basis for criminalizing a 
variety of oppositional political activities.  Article 26 prohibited any 
act counter to the Charter principles.  Taken together, these vaguely 
worded provisions perversely offered a basis for relabeling 
prosecutions for political offenses as measures to uphold human 
rights. 
Notwithstanding their being stuck with an educational system 
in which studying Qaddafi’s ideas was a central task, many 
Libyans had managed to gain an appreciation of what genuine 
human rights involved, as indicated by the event that ignited the 
revolution.  Sparking the protests was the arrest of the human 
rights attorney Fathi Terbil on February 15, 2011.  At great risk to 
himself, Terbil had sought to represent families of victims of the 
notorious 1996 Abu Salim Prison massacre in which perhaps 
twelve hundred prisoners had been slaughtered.36  That Libyans 
rose in revolt in response to this incident proved that they 
appreciated the courage of this defender of human rights.  It was 
therefore fair to say that anger over human rights violations was a 
key factor in the outbreak of rebellion in Benghazi that quickly led 
to uprisings in other areas. 
                                                     
36 See Sarah Boesveld, The Arab Awakening: The Beginning of the End for the 
Gaddafi Regime, NAT’L POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 10:02 PM), 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/19/the-arab-awakening-the-seeds-of-
libyas-uprising-were-planted-long-before-the-arab-spring/ (describing how 
Terbil’s arrest prompted a protest that quickly mushroomed into a local uprising 
that soon ignited a revolution). 
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In Libya there is ample evidence of the popularity that human 
rights ideals enjoy in the abstract, but to shut the door on an era of 
gross human rights abuses, these ideals must now be transformed 
into operational guidelines that are accepted and internalized as 
the governing norms.  Meanwhile, events in 2012 like the 
prolonged incommunicado captivity of Saif al-Islam Qaddafi 
indicated that the Libyan legal system was falling grievously short 
in terms of meeting the basic requirements of the rule of law. 
5. THE TROUBLING CASE OF SAIF AL-ISLAM QADDAFI 
For those hoping to see Libya rapidly adjust to rigorous 
adherence to international human rights law, the case of Saif al-
Islam Qaddafi raised red flags.  It suggested that crass political 
calculations were influencing the functioning of Libya’s post-
revolutionary legal system. 
As the revolution gained momentum in February 2011, Saif al-
Islam Qaddafi, the dictator’s oldest son and his likely successor, 
tried to distance himself from the ills of Qaddafi’s system.  The 
ambitious Saif apparently calculated that, if he was to accede to 
power, he had to pretend to share the popular rejection of the 
status quo.  He belatedly acknowledged Libyans’ aspirations for 
freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism.  Announcing that 
major changes were in the offing and that the regime would make 
concessions in these areas, Saif tried to co-opt the revolutionary 
pressures.  One could see this as a positive sign, indicating that 
despite Qaddafi’s determined efforts to inculcate Libyans with his 
anti-democratic and anti-constitutionalist philosophy, even his 
own son and would-be heir had to recognize that the ideals of 
freedom, democracy, and constitutionalism had enormous appeal. 
Hoping to calm the revolutionary turmoil, in a televised 
address on February 20, 2011, Saif spoke as if work on a 
constitution would commence forthwith and as if a democratic 
government would be inaugurated in which Libyans would enjoy 
freedom, tacitly acknowledging that Libyans were fed up with the 
jamahiriyya system.  He further promised that “civilized” laws 
would be adopted and that “silly” criminal penalties would be 
discarded, effectively conceding that the legal system was in need 
of reforms.  Seeking to convince Libyans that their aspirations 
could be promptly fulfilled without a revolution, he lectured: 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/4
05_MAYER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2013  11:00 AM 
2013] BUILDING THE NEW LIBYA 381 
 
Today we are at a crossroads . . . We either tell ourselves, 
“We are Libyans, and this is our country.  We want . . . 
freedom, democracy and real reform, this and that, and this 
has been planned and agreed upon and was supposed to be 
done at the forthcoming general congress assembly” . . . [or] 
we will all seek the judgment of weapons. . . . So I tell you 
that before we use weapons as a decider and we enter a 
civil war and total chaos . . . tomorrow we conduct a 
historic national initiative . . . to adopt a battery of laws 
initially agreed upon: the press law, the civil society—
civilised laws, new laws . . . to widen freedoms, to cancel 
many of the existing hindrances, the silly existing 
punishments, and to initiate a national dialogue on a 
Libyan constitution.37 
The revolution continued to gather momentum in the wake of 
Saif’s speech, making it glaringly obvious that Libyans did not 
trust him to oversee the reforms for which they called.  Saif had 
made an accurate diagnosis of the grievances that had led Libyans 
to revolt, but he lacked any credibility as a leader who would put 
an end to the abuses of the Green Book era. 
After Saif’s cynical attempt to co-opt the slogans of the 
revolution failed, he elected to join the pro-regime militias engaged 
in fighting to crush the rebellion.  On November 19, 2011, Saif was 
finally captured in the desert and brought to the western town of 
Zintan.  It was encouraging to observe the leader of the local 
council proclaiming his wish to see Saif get a fair trial in Libya.  
Presumably regretting the way Saif’s father had been abused and 
killed after his capture, he offered a thoughtful assessment: “There 
is no point to make a revolution for justice, and then you become 
the same killers.”38 
The fact that Saif was captured alive offered a precious 
opportunity for Libya’s post-revolutionary leaders to compensate 
                                                     
37 Gaddafi Son: “We Will Eradicate Them All”, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011, 4:25 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/gaddafi-son-muammar-
libya. 
38 Chris Stephen & Luke Harding, Gaddafi’s Intelligence Chief Captured in 
Southern Desert, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2011, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/20/gaddafi-son-pretended-
camel-herder. 
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for the torment and murder of his father by ensuring that Saif was 
treated according to the norms of international criminal justice and 
was afforded a fair public trial for his alleged crimes.  As it turned 
out, the weak central government in Tripoli could not even 
manage to wrest Saif from those holding him captive in Zintan, 
who seemed determined to keep him incarcerated there as a 
bargaining chip.  As the months passed and Saif continued to be 
confined in Zintan and denied access to an attorney or a judge, 
indications mounted that the Libyan legal system was inadequate 
to handle a case of this magnitude.39  Viewed in the abstract, the 
idea of a Libyan court holding Saif accountable might have had 
merit, but this did not take into account the aggravated chaos 
afflicting Libya and the political tensions that were spilling over 
into the functioning of the legal system. 
Seemingly determined to downplay the manifest inadequacies 
of Libya’s courts, Libyan authorities resisted making a 
commitment to turn Saif over to the ICC, which had indicted him 
for crimes against humanity.  Under the Rome Statute, the ICC 
could assert jurisdiction for reasons such as the Libyan system 
having proved itself unable to carry out the proceedings or having 
engaged in an unjustified delay.40  Under the circumstances, to 
ensure that Saif’s protracted incarceration did not stretch out 
indefinitely and culminate in a sham trial in which a verdict calling 
for his death by hanging would be a foregone conclusion, 
surrendering him to the ICC was the logical option. 
A particularly troubling incident occurred in June 2012, when 
Melinda Taylor, a lawyer from the ICC assigned to defend Saif, 
was imprisoned in Zintan along with three of her colleagues after 
visiting Saif on an official mission to discuss his defense.  Libyan 
officials indignantly accused her of committing crimes including 
spying, and went on to threaten that the ICC delegation members 
would be tried for their alleged crimes in proceedings from which 
                                                     
39 See Chris Stephen, Saif Gaddafi Sets Libya’s New Rulers a Test of Commitment 
to Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2012/jan/07/saif-gaddafi-libya-human-rights. 
40 See Libya: Q&A on the ICC and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 
23, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/libya-qa-icc-and-saif-al-
islam-gaddafi (“[ICC] only steps in where national jurisdictions are unable or 
unwilling to prosecute Rome Statute crimes . . . ‘at the earliest opportunity.’”). 
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the defendants would be excluded.  Under international pressures 
to relent, the delegation’s Libyan captors eventually released them 
after holding them for almost a month.41  This shocking 
mishandling of a visit by an ICC delegation was a symptom of the 
deficiencies of Libya’s system of transitional justice.  Upon her 
release, Taylor expressed her conviction that the treatment that she 
and her colleagues endured, which included their detention 
without being given any reason for their arrest and the confiscation 
of confidential ICC documents, proved that her client Saif could 
not get a fair trial in Libya.42 
In yet another worrying development, it was announced in 
September 2012 that Saif’s trial would be delayed for at least 
another five months after the capture of Abdullah al-Senussi, 
Qaddafi’s former spy chief—the pretext being that Senussi might 
reveal information relevant for Saif’s prosecution.43  In this 
connection it was not only outsiders who offered criticisms; the 
head of the Libyan Council on Freedom and Human Rights 
protested to reporters that the legal steps needed to ensure fair 
treatment of suspects were being bypassed in what he called “an 
exceptional justice system which lacks the basis of a fair trial.”44  
The ICC also became a target of criticisms for failing to find a better 
way to manage this awkward conflict.45 
                                                     
41 See Luke Harding & Julian Borger, Libya Frees International Criminal Court 
Legal Team Accused of Spying, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2012, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/02/libya-releases-icc-officials 
(explaining the circumstances around the ICC delegation members’ release, which 
the Libyan government characterized as a “humanitarian gesture”). 
42 Julian Borger, ICC Lawyer: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Will Not Get a Fair Trial in 
Libya, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2012, 9:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/ 
jul/06/icc-lawyer-gaddafi-trial-libya. 
43 Ali Shuaib, Gaddafi Son’s Libya Trial to be Delayed by Five Months: Official, 
REUTERS, (Sept. 9, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/ 
09/09/us-libya-saif-trial-idUSBRE8880F720120909. 
44 Id. 
45 See Mark Kersten, No Winners in ICC-Libya Standoff, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 8, 
2012, 2:50 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/08/no_ 
winners_in_icc_libya_standoff (proposing that the disputes over where to try Saif 
and Senussi and the dissension within the ICC about how to handle the cases 
could ultimately weaken the ICC and also undermine the pursuit of justice in 
post-Qaddafi Libya). 
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For those who hoped that Libya would leave behind Qaddafi’s 
arbitrary and cruel mode of criminal justice, the way that Saif’s 
case was mishandled was highly regrettable.  Far from teaching 
Libyans how criminal cases should be conducted, it suggested that 
the mentalities of many important players in the public arena 
remained mired in ways of thinking that reflected Qaddafi’s own 
contempt for the law. 
6. GREEN SHOOTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INHOSPITABLE SOIL 
As indicated, observers of the Libyan scene had ample grounds 
for concluding that the transition from Qaddafi’s despotism to a 
sound democratic order was going to be difficult and that the 
disregard for international human rights law that had 
characterized the previous era was far from over.  Nonetheless, 
there were some factors that pointed in a positive direction. 
One of the constructive steps that the Transitional National 
Council took was to repudiate the lawlessness of the Qaddafi era 
by quickly seizing the initiative while the war still raged to adopt 
in August 2011 a Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional 
Stage.46  This document indicated in the preamble that the new 
order would break with Qaddafi’s dictatorship, stipulating that the 
objectives included freedom, democracy, and justice; retrieving the 
rights looted by the Qaddafi regime; and excluding “injustice, 
tyranny, despotism, exploitation and dictatorship.”47  Article 7 
provided that the state was to respect human rights and basic 
freedoms and commit itself to joining international and regional 
human rights declarations and charters.  These positive elements 
were countervailed by some problematic features, such as the 
stipulation in Article 1 that Islamic law would be the main source 
of legislation, which raised the possibility that Islamic criteria 
could be used to nullify some human rights.  Whatever its 
shortcomings, the issuance of the draft constitution by itself 
signaled a departure from the anti-constitutionalist policies of the 
Qaddafi era. 
                                                     
46 See LIBYAN TRANSITIONAL NAT’L COUNCIL, DRAFT CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER 
FOR THE TRANSITIONAL STAGE, Sept. 2011, available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/4e80475b2.html (outlining fundamental democratic principles for 
Libya’s transitional government). 
47 Id. pmbl. 
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The large Berber minority in western Libya, which may 
constitute ten percent of the population, rejoiced at Qaddafi’s 
downfall.  He had insisted that all Libyans shared a common Arab 
identity, compelling Berbers to acquiesce in the suppression of 
their language and culture.  When Qaddafi’s regime crumbled, the 
Berber community quickly demanded cultural autonomy.48  It was 
hard to predict how the Berbers’ demands would ultimately fare, 
but the provision in Article 1 of the Draft Constitutional Charter 
seemed to repudiate Qaddafi’s Arab chauvinism, recognizing 
diversity by stipulating that the state should guarantee cultural 
rights for all components of society and their languages.49 
Constituting another promising development, the July 2012 
elections to the General National Assembly were widely regarded 
as free and fair, and resulted in a victory for centrist forces.  The 
well-regarded longstanding leader of the overseas opposition to 
Qaddafi, Mohammed el-Megarif, was chosen as the country’s 
interim president in August.  Living as a fugitive for many years, 
el-Megarif had written extensively on the evils of Qaddafi’s 
regime.50  In October, the human rights lawyer Ali Zidan was 
elected as the interim prime minister.51  Such leadership gives rise 
to hopes that Libya stands a better chance of avoiding a repetition 
of the abuses that blighted the country for decades. 
                                                     
48 See Alice Fordham, An Exuberant Awakening for Libya’s Berbers, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/an-
exuberant-awakening-for-libyas-berbers/2011/11/11/gIQASov7NN_story.html 
(describing the desire for official recognition of the culture and language of the 
Amazigh people). 
49 LIBYAN TRANSITIONAL NAT’L COUNCIL, supra note 46. 
50 See Mohammed el-Megarif Elected as Libya’s Interim President, GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 9, 2012, 8:08 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/ 
aug/10/mohammed-el-megarif-libya-president (detailing el-Megarif’s exile from 
and subsequent return to Libya following the revolution, whereupon he 
established a new political party and was ultimately able to win election as the 
country’s interim president). 
51 Mohamed Eljarh, New Prime Minister for Libya from the Liberal Bloc, MIDDLE 
E. ONLINE (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.middle-east-online.com/ 
english/?id=54924. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
After joyously celebrating their liberation from a tyrant, 
Libyans were obliged to cope with dangerous mayhem and 
turmoil.  In a setting where central state institutions were fragile, 
the factionalism and violent actions of competing armed militias 
that had emerged in the wake of the 2011 revolution constitute 
major obstacles in the way of achieving a basic measure of security 
and founding a healthy democratic order.  Libya’s difficulties in 
putting the civil war behind it and patching over bitter 
antagonisms that were fostered by months of bloody conflict have 
potentially broader significance.  They augur ill for the future of 
Syria, where a much longer war against the al-Assad dictatorship 
has been intensifying hostilities between political factions, 
ethnicities, and religious sects. 
The period of more than four decades during which Libyans 
suffered under Qaddafi’s thuggish dictatorship had provided them 
with the opportunity to learn the hard way about the value of 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.  Unfortunately, 
Qaddafi had bequeathed governmental and judicial institutions 
that were mere shells, meaning that rebuilding Libya would 
require effortful toil to erect the essentials for an effective 
government and a well-functioning system of criminal justice. 
Adding to the difficulties of a successful transition, decades of 
living in the miasma of Qaddafi’s jamahiriyya had fostered 
mindsets and behavior patterns that were at odds with respect for 
human rights, and these would need to be unlearned.  A sense of 
the adjustment problems now facing Libyans can be gleaned from 
the writing of the distinguished Libyan novelist Hisham Matar, 
whose own life was scarred by Qaddafi’s terror apparatus.  Matar’s 
dissident father had figured among Qaddafi’s many victims, 
having disappeared after being abducted by Libyan agents in 
Egypt and imprisoned incommunicado in Libya.  For long years 
Matar remained obsessed with being reunited with his father, but 
hopes that were initially raised after the revolution were dashed 
when Mater learned that no trace of his father could be found.  In 
Matar’s 2006 semi-autobiographical novel In the Country of Men, 
the reader encounters the perspectives of a young Libyan boy 
whose dissident father is arrested and savagely tortured and 
whose spirited mother succumbs to alcoholism as she seeks to 
numb her sense of oppression.  The boy’s childhood takes place in 
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a setting where Qaddafi and his security apparatus are dominant 
presences, where daily lives are pervaded by fear and 
apprehension, and where people are haunted by visions of public 
executions and tormented by the private betrayals that they 
commit in desperate efforts to survive.  The boy winds up with a 
personality that is deformed by internalizing the pathologies of 
Libyan society. 
With Qaddafi removed from the scene, Matar recognized the 
obstacles lying in the way of constructing a new vision of 
citizenship in democratic Libya, which entailed adopting new 
ways of thinking, but he refused to despair.  He described the 
momentous task facing his compatriots: 
We are of course confronted with the most profound 
challenge: how to build a democracy in a country whose 
institutions and civil society have been strangled for 42 
years.  There will be setbacks, we will make mistakes, but 
there is no other way to learn.  We have defeated Gaddafi 
on the battlefield, now we must defeat him in our 
imagination.  We must not allow his legacy to corrupt our 
dream.  Let’s keep focused on the true prize: unity, 
democracy and the rule of law.  Let’s not seek revenge; that 
would diminish our future.52 
                                                     
52 Hisham Matar, Gaddafi Is Gone: Long Live Unity, Democracy and the Rule of 
Law, Posted in Comment Is Free, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2011, 3:30 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/22/libya-gaddafi-tripoli-
hisham-matar. 
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